Executive Summary
Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Command and Control. Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment.
Why Attackers Use It
Attackers use Ingress Tool Transfer because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Command and Control tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
MITRE Description
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as copy, finger, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as <code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> and <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as curl, scp, sftp, tftp, rsync, finger, and wget.(Citation: t1105_lolbas) A number of these tools, such as wget, curl, and scp, also exist on ESXi. After downloading a file, a threat actor may attempt to verify its integrity by checking its hash value (e.g., via certutil -hashfile).(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence COSCMICENERGY 2023)
Adversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as yum or winget, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows search-ms protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)
Files can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)
Attack Flow
- Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
- Attacker executes Ingress Tool Transfer to achieve its tactical objective (Command and Control).
- Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).
Prerequisites
- Platform(s): ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.
Common Tools
- Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.
Commands
No universal command represents Ingress Tool Transfer. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
Network Traffic
- Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.
Windows Events
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
Sysmon Events
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
Detection Opportunities
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
Sigma Rules
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Splunk Queries
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
Investigation Workflow
- Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Ingress Tool Transfer and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
- Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
- Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
- Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
- Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
- Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.
Containment
- Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
- Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
- Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
- Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.
Mitigation
- M1031 -- Network Intrusion Prevention: Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
- M1037 -- Filter Network Traffic: Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic.
Related Techniques
- T1001
- T1001.001
- T1001.002
- T1001.003
- T1003.001
- T1003.002
- T1003.003
- T1005
- T1007
- T1008
- T1010
- T1012
- T1014
- T1016
- T1016.001
- T1018
- T1020
- T1021
- T1021.001
- T1021.002
- T1021.004
- T1021.005
- T1021.006
- T1027
- T1027.001
- T1027.002
- T1027.003
- T1027.004
- T1027.005
- T1027.007
- T1027.009
- T1027.010
- T1027.011
- T1027.013
- T1027.015
- T1027.016
- T1029
- T1030
- T1033
- T1036
- T1036.001
- T1036.003
- T1036.004
- T1036.005
- T1036.008
- T1036.010
- T1037.001
- T1039
- T1040
- T1041
- T1046
- T1047
- T1048
- T1048.002
- T1048.003
- T1049
- T1052.001
- T1053.003
- T1053.005
- T1055
- T1055.001
- T1055.002
- T1055.003
- T1055.004
- T1055.012
- T1056
- T1056.001
- T1056.004
- T1057
- T1059
- T1059.001
- T1059.002
- T1059.003
- T1059.004
- T1059.005
- T1059.006
- T1059.007
- T1059.008
- T1059.011
- T1068
- T1069
- T1069.001
- T1069.002
- T1070
- T1070.004
- T1070.006
- T1070.007
- T1070.009
- T1071
- T1071.001
- T1071.002
- T1071.003
- T1071.004
- T1072
- T1074
- T1074.001
- T1078
- T1078.002
- T1078.004
- T1080
- T1082
- T1083
- T1087
- T1087.001
- T1087.003
- T1090
- T1090.001
- T1090.002
- T1090.003
- T1091
- T1095
- T1098
- T1098.004
- T1102
- T1102.001
- T1102.002
- T1104
- T1106
- T1110.001
- T1112
- T1113
- T1114.001
- T1114.002
- T1115
- T1119
- T1123
- T1124
- T1125
- T1129
- T1132
- T1132.001
- T1132.002
- T1133
- T1134.001
- T1134.002
- T1134.004
- T1136.001
- T1140
- T1185
- T1189
- T1190
- T1195.001
- T1195.002
- T1197
- T1203
- T1204.001
- T1204.002
- T1205
- T1205.002
- T1210
- T1213.003
- T1217
- T1218.004
- T1218.005
- T1218.007
- T1218.008
- T1218.010
- T1218.011
- T1219
- T1219.002
- T1221
- T1222.002
- T1480
- T1480.001
- T1480.002
- T1482
- T1485
- T1496.001
- T1497
- T1497.001
- T1497.003
- T1505.003
- T1518
- T1518.001
- T1534
- T1539
- T1543
- T1543.001
- T1543.002
- T1543.003
- T1543.004
- T1546.003
- T1546.004
- T1547
- T1547.001
- T1547.004
- T1547.009
- T1547.012
- T1548.002
- T1550.001
- T1550.002
- T1550.003
- T1552.001
- T1552.004
- T1552.005
- T1553.001
- T1553.002
- T1553.004
- T1553.005
- T1553.006
- T1554
- T1555
- T1555.001
- T1555.003
- T1555.005
- T1559.001
- T1559.002
- T1560
- T1560.001
- T1560.002
- T1560.003
- T1561.002
- T1564
- T1564.001
- T1564.003
- T1564.004
- T1564.011
- T1565.002
- T1566.001
- T1566.002
- T1566.004
- T1567
- T1567.002
- T1568
- T1568.001
- T1568.002
- T1569.001
- T1569.002
- T1570
- T1571
- T1572
- T1573
- T1573.001
- T1573.002
- T1574.001
- T1574.006
- T1583.001
- T1583.004
- T1583.006
- T1584.001
- T1584.004
- T1584.005
- T1584.006
- T1584.008
- T1585.003
- T1586.002
- T1586.003
- T1587.001
- T1588.001
- T1588.002
- T1588.003
- T1589.002
- T1595.002
- T1598
- T1598.002
- T1598.003
- T1608.001
- T1608.004
- T1609
- T1610
- T1611
- T1614
- T1614.001
- T1620
- T1622
- T1652
- T1654
- T1657
- T1665
- T1673
- T1678
- T1680
- T1685
- T1686
- T1686.003