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Local Account (T1136.001) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence . Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems.
Local Account (T1136.001) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence. Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems.
Attackers use Local Account because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Persistence tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the useradd command can be used, while on macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common Network Device CLI commands such as <code>username</code>, to ESXi servers via esxcli system account add, or to Kubernetes clusters using the kubectl utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)
Adversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles – for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
No universal command represents Local Account. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.