Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Executive Summary

Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location (T1036.005) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth. Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them.

Why Attackers Use It

Attackers use Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Stealth tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.

MITRE Description

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). Alternatively, a Windows Registry key may be given a close approximation to a key used by a legitimate program. In containerized environments, a threat actor may create a resource in a trusted namespace or one that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Backdoor 2023)

Attack Flow

1. Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
2. Attacker executes Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location to achieve its tactical objective (Stealth).
3. Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).

Prerequisites

• Platform(s): Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
• ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.

Common Tools

• Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.

Commands

No universal command represents Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.

Network Traffic

• Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.

Windows Events

Sysmon Events

Detection Opportunities

No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.

Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A

Sigma Rules

A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.

Splunk Queries

Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.

Investigation Workflow

1. Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
2. Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
3. Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
4. Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
5. Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
6. Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.

Containment

1. Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
2. Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
3. Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
4. Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.

Mitigation

• M1022 -- Restrict File and Directory Permissions: Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files.
• M1038 -- Execution Prevention: Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms.
• M1045 -- Code Signing: Code Signing is a security process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by digitally signing executables, scripts, and other code artifacts.

Related Techniques

• T1003.001
• T1020
• T1021
• T1021.004
• T1027.005
• T1036
• T1036.002
• T1036.008
• T1036.010
• T1037
• T1037.004
• T1039
• T1040
• T1048.002
• T1052.001
• T1053.003
• T1055.005
• T1056.003
• T1057
• T1059.002
• T1059.003
• T1059.004
• T1070.003
• T1070.004
• T1070.007
• T1070.008
• T1071.001
• T1072
• T1080
• T1082
• T1083
• T1091
• T1098
• T1098.004
• T1105
• T1114.002
• T1132
• T1134
• T1134.004
• T1136
• T1136.001
• T1137.006
• T1140
• T1176.001
• T1185
• T1189
• T1205
• T1222.002
• T1480.002
• T1505.003
• T1505.004
• T1534
• T1542.003
• T1546.004
• T1546.012
• T1547
• T1547.006
• T1547.012
• T1547.013
• T1555.005
• T1559.001
• T1564.011
• T1574.001
• T1583.003
• T1584.001
• T1587.001
• T1587.003
• T1588.001
• T1588.002
• T1598.002
• T1608.004
• T1673
• T1678
• T1684.001
• T1685.001
• T1686