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Cron (T1053.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation . Adversaries may abuse the <code cron</code utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code cron</code utility is a tim…
Cron (T1053.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation. Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.
Attackers use Cron because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, ESXi environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. In ESXi environments, cron jobs must be created directly via the crontab file (e.g., /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root).(Citation: CloudSEK ESXiArgs 2023)
No universal command represents Cron. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.