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Archive via Custom Method (T1560.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection . An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method.
Archive via Custom Method (T1560.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method.
Attackers use Archive via Custom Method because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
No universal command represents Archive via Custom Method. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.