Security Account Manager

Executive Summary

Security Account Manager (T1003.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Credential Access. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored.

Why Attackers Use It

Attackers use Security Account Manager because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Credential Access tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.

MITRE Description

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:

• pwdumpx.exe
• gsecdump
• Mimikatz
• secretsdump.py

Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:

• <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code>
• <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code>

Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)

Notes:

• RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.
• RID 501 is the guest account.
• User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

Attack Flow

1. Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
2. Attacker executes Security Account Manager to achieve its tactical objective (Credential Access).
3. Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).

Prerequisites

• Platform(s): Windows
• ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.

Common Tools

• Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.

Commands

No universal command represents Security Account Manager. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.

Network Traffic

• Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.

Windows Events

Sysmon Events

Detection Opportunities

No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.

Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A

Sigma Rules

A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.

Splunk Queries

Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.

Investigation Workflow

1. Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Security Account Manager and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
2. Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
3. Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
4. Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
5. Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
6. Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.

Containment

1. Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
2. Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
3. Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
4. Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.

Mitigation

• M1027 -- Password Policies: Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access.
• M1026 -- Privileged Account Management: Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts).
• M1028 -- Operating System Configuration: Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality.
• M1017 -- User Training: User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques.

Related Techniques

• T1003
• T1003.001
• T1003.003
• T1003.004
• T1005
• T1036.003
• T1053.005
• T1059.003
• T1071.001
• T1083
• T1105
• T1110.003
• T1190
• T1550.002
• T1583.004
• T1652