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Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration . Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel.
Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration. Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel.
Attackers use Exfiltration Over Web Service because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Exfiltration tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on ESXi, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
No universal command represents Exfiltration Over Web Service. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.