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Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites (T1567.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration . Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel.
Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites (T1567.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration. Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel.
Attackers use Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Exfiltration tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Windows, ESXi environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel. Text storage sites, such as <code>pastebin[.]com</code>, are commonly used by developers to share code and other information.
Text storage sites are often used to host malicious code for C2 communication (e.g., Stage Capabilities), but adversaries may also use these sites to exfiltrate collected data. Furthermore, paid features and encryption options may allow adversaries to conceal and store data more securely.(Citation: Pastebin EchoSec)
Note: This is distinct from Exfiltration to Code Repository, which highlight access to code repositories via APIs.
No universal command represents Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.