Customer Relationship Management Software

Executive Summary

Customer Relationship Management Software (T1213.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information.

Why Attackers Use It

Attackers use Customer Relationship Management Software because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on SaaS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.

MITRE Description

Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data.

Once adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized Phishing emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization’s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.(Citation: Bleeping Computer US Cellular Hack 2022)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Mint Mobile Hack 2021)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Bank Hack 2020)

CRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.

Attack Flow

1. Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
2. Attacker executes Customer Relationship Management Software to achieve its tactical objective (Collection).
3. Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).

Prerequisites

• Platform(s): SaaS
• ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.

Common Tools

• Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.

Commands

No universal command represents Customer Relationship Management Software. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.

Network Traffic

• Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.

Windows Events

Sysmon Events

Detection Opportunities

No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.

Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A

Sigma Rules

A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.

Splunk Queries

Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.

Investigation Workflow

1. Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Customer Relationship Management Software and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
2. Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
3. Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
4. Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
5. Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
6. Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.

Containment

1. Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
2. Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
3. Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
4. Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.

Mitigation

• M1018 -- User Account Management: User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation.
• M1017 -- User Training: User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques.
• M1054 -- Software Configuration: Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats.
• M1047 -- Audit: Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations.

Related Techniques

• T1213