Executive Summary
Data from Information Repositories (T1213) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information.
Why Attackers Use It
Attackers use Data from Information Repositories because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS, IaaS, Office Suite environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
MITRE Description
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account).
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
- Policies, procedures, and standards
- Physical / logical network diagrams
- System architecture diagrams
- Technical system documentation
- Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)
- Work / project schedules
- Source code snippets
- Links to network shares and other internal resources
- Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII)
Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:
- Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases
- Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories
- Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams
In some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)
Attack Flow
- Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
- Attacker executes Data from Information Repositories to achieve its tactical objective (Collection).
- Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).
Prerequisites
- Platform(s): Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS, IaaS, Office Suite
- ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.
Common Tools
- Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.
Commands
No universal command represents Data from Information Repositories. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
Network Traffic
- Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.
Windows Events
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
Sysmon Events
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
Detection Opportunities
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
Sigma Rules
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Splunk Queries
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
Investigation Workflow
- Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Data from Information Repositories and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
- Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
- Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
- Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
- Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
- Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.
Containment
- Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
- Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
- Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
- Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.
Mitigation
- M1032 -- Multi-factor Authentication: Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access.
- M1060 -- Out-of-Band Communications Channel: Establish secure out-of-band communication channels to ensure the continuity of critical communications during security incidents, data integrity attacks, or in-network communication failures.
- M1017 -- User Training: User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques.
- M1054 -- Software Configuration: Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats.
- M1018 -- User Account Management: User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation.
- M1047 -- Audit: Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations.
- M1041 -- Encrypt Sensitive Information: Protect sensitive information at rest, in transit, and during processing by using strong encryption algorithms.
Related Techniques
- T1005
- T1041
- T1070.004
- T1071.001
- T1082
- T1083
- T1113
- T1213.001
- T1213.002
- T1213.003
- T1213.004
- T1213.005
- T1213.006
- T1560