Loading AttackTrace...
Loading AttackTrace...
Power Settings (T1653) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence . Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines.
Power Settings (T1653) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence. Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines.
Attackers use Power Settings because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Persistence tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows, Linux, macOS, Network Devices environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.(Citation: Sleep, shut down, hibernate)
Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.(Citation: Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options)(Citation: systemdsleep Linux)
For example, powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.(Citation: Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users) Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.(Citation: BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware) Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.(Citation: CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign)
Aware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.(Citation: Condi-Botnet-binaries)
No universal command represents Power Settings. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.