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Group Policy Preferences (T1552.006) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Credential Access . Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP).
Group Policy Preferences (T1552.006) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Credential Access. Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP).
Attackers use Group Policy Preferences because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Credential Access tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)
These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)
The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:
On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>
No universal command represents Group Policy Preferences. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.