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Backup Software Discovery (T1518.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Discovery . Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system.
Backup Software Discovery (T1518.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Discovery. Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system.
Attackers use Backup Software Discovery because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Discovery tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows, macOS, Linux environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, such as Data Destruction, Inhibit System Recovery, or Data Encrypted for Impact.
Commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for, such as Veeam, Acronis, Dropbox, or Paragon.(Citation: Symantec Play Ransomware 2023)
No universal command represents Backup Software Discovery. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.