Executive Summary
Domain Account (T1136.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence. Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems.
Why Attackers Use It
Attackers use Domain Account because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Persistence tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
MITRE Description
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.(Citation: Savill 1999)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Attack Flow
- Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
- Attacker executes Domain Account to achieve its tactical objective (Persistence).
- Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).
Prerequisites
- Platform(s): Linux, macOS, Windows
- ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.
Common Tools
- Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.
Commands
No universal command represents Domain Account. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
Network Traffic
- Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.
Windows Events
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
Sysmon Events
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
Detection Opportunities
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
Sigma Rules
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Splunk Queries
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
Investigation Workflow
- Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Domain Account and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
- Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
- Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
- Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
- Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
- Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.
Containment
- Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
- Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
- Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
- Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.
Mitigation
- M1032 -- Multi-factor Authentication: Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access.
- M1028 -- Operating System Configuration: Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality.
- M1030 -- Network Segmentation: Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications.
- M1026 -- Privileged Account Management: Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts).
Related Techniques
- T1003.001
- T1018
- T1021.002
- T1027
- T1027.002
- T1047
- T1049
- T1136
- T1570