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Remote Data Staging (T1074.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection . Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration.
Remote Data Staging (T1074.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration.
Attackers use Remote Data Staging because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
No universal command represents Remote Data Staging. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.