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Relocate Malware (T1070.010) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth . Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses.
Relocate Malware (T1070.010) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth. Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses.
Attackers use Relocate Malware because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Stealth tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with File Deletion to cleanup older artifacts.
Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target File/Path Exclusions as well as specific locations associated with establishing Persistence.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)
Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as User Execution and Phishing) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., Timestomp).
No universal command represents Relocate Malware. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.