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Hypervisor CLI (T1059.012) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Execution . Adversaries may abuse hypervisor command line interpreters (CLIs) to execute malicious commands.
Hypervisor CLI (T1059.012) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Execution. Adversaries may abuse hypervisor command line interpreters (CLIs) to execute malicious commands.
Attackers use Hypervisor CLI because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Execution tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on ESXi environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may abuse hypervisor command line interpreters (CLIs) to execute malicious commands. Hypervisor CLIs typically enable a wide variety of functionality for managing both the hypervisor itself and the guest virtual machines it hosts.
For example, on ESXi systems, tools such as esxcli and vim-cmd allow administrators to configure firewall rules and log forwarding on the hypervisor, list virtual machines, start and stop virtual machines, and more.(Citation: Broadcom ESXCLI Reference)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: LOLESXi) Adversaries may be able to leverage these tools in order to support further actions, such as File and Directory Discovery or Data Encrypted for Impact.
No universal command represents Hypervisor CLI. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.